Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 16 | Issue 3

Article 4

2004

The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003: Was Congress
Actually Trying to Solve the Problem or Add to It?
Sameh I. Mobarek

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Sameh I. Mobarek The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003: Was Congress Actually Trying to Solve the Problem or Add to It?, 16 Loy. Consumer L.
Rev. 247 (2004).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol16/iss3/4

This Student Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law
Review by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003: Was
Congress Actually Trying to Solve the
Problem or Add to it?
By Sameh I. Mobarek*

I. Introduction
Imagine a world devoid of vacant space where every
conceivable surface is filled with advertisements. Imagine also that,
after running out of space, marketers developed free-flying robots
that roam the planet to hypnotize consumers into buying their
products. 2 In that world, the heroes walked around, not with a sixshooter, but with a fly swatter to squash the commercials before they
got them.3 They closed their windows at night to keep the
commercial pests from perching onto their pillows and seducing them
as they slept. Such a world existed in the fertile imagination of now
deceased science-fiction writer, Philip K. Dick.5 But how far
removed from this make-belief world are we in the Spam-infested
reality of today?
The problem of unsolicited commercial email advertisements,
commonly called "Spam," is quickly growing to replace all other
problems caused by the marketing industry. Consumers receive all
*
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Brent Staples, The Battle Against Junk Mail and Spyware on the Web, N.Y.
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available
at
http://www.nytimes.con
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3 Id.
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id.
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types of Spam on a daily, even hourly, basis that create both
annoyance and inconvenience. Internet Service Providers ("ISPs")
spend millions of dollars each year to ensure that their users are
shielded from the aggravations of Spam. 6 But, if recipients do not
want it,
and ISPs would rather not deliver it, why does Spam still
7
exist?
The term Spam is said to have developed in the 1980s when a
computer user created a simple computer program that repeatedly
typed the word "Spam." 8 The prankster may have been inspired by a
Monty Python comedy sketch that takes place in a restaurant where
every meal on the menu contained Spam, a tinned meat product for
which Hormel Foods owns the United States trademark. Later, the
term Spam came to be applied to articles posted to newsgroups that
were unrelated to the discussions involved and violated the rules of
the forum.' 0 Often, these articles were cross-linked with posts in
other newsgroups and quickly became a nuisance." Gradually, the
term Spam became associated with junk email messages and
advertisements for products and services of a dubious nature.
The proliferation of Spam is largely supported by simple
economics. The fact is that it costs much less for marketers to send
Spam than for recipients to receive it and ISPs to process it. 3 In
2002, the Wall Street Journal undertook a study on the economics of
Spam.14 One case cited a mailing of 3.5 million Spam messages that
resulted in 81 sales in the first week, a success rate of 0.0023%, with
6

See infra Part II.

7 ePrivacy

Group,
The
Economics
of Spain,
available at
http://www.eprivacygroup.com/article/articlestatic/58/1/6 (last visited Jan. 12,
2004) [hereinafter ePrivacy Economics of Spam]. ePrivacy Group is a privately
held company that provides real-time services to verify the identity of senders of
email messages and message authenticity. See http://www.eprivacygroup.com (last
visited Mar. 16, 2004).
8 John Magee, The Law Regulating Unsolicited Commercial Email: An
InternationalPerspective, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 333,

336 (2003).
9 Id. at 336-37.
10 Id. at 337.
11 Id.
12 Id.

13ePrivacy Economics of Spam, supra note 7.
14

Id.
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each sale worth $19 to the marketer.' 5 The result to the marketer was
a profit of $1,500, after deducting an average cost of $100 per million
messages sent, in the first week alone. 16 Now, if the same company
sends 100 million messages, it would conceivably make a profit in
excess of $25,000.17 Advances in technology and broadband Internet
access made this scenario a reality in less time and money to
marketers.
In the face of such motivation, regulators and ISPs struggled
to stem the growing tide of Spam. State legislators passed anti-Spam
laws, and ISPs pursued civil actions against some of the marketers
using Spam.18 However, because of the patchwork of regulations that
state laws created, and the limited resources of ISPs, it became clear
that a national solution to the problem was necessary.' 9 To this end,
Congress debated several proposals to curb the nationwide use of
Spam, ultimately enacting the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 (the "Act")
in December 2003.20

This article will discuss the background of the problem of
Spam and some of the public and private efforts undertaken to
address it.2 1 In particular, this article will focus on the Act and some
of its key provisions with a view to their effectiveness in meeting
Congress' objectives. 2 2 Finally, this article will analyze the Act with
regards to the overarching problem of Spain and its impact on both
marketers and consumers.

15 Id.
16

Id.

17

id.

18 See generally Rene Ryman, The Adverse Impact of Anti-Spam Companies,

20 No. 1 COMPUTER &

INTERNET LAW.

15, 16-17 (2003).

'9 Dannielle Cisneros, Do Not Advertise: The Current Fight Against
UnsolicitedAdvertisements, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 10, 12 (2003).

20 See generally Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and
Marketing Act of 2003 (CAN-SPAM Act), Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699
(2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-13; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1037; 28 U.S.C. §
994; and 47 U.S.C. § 227).
21 See infra Part II.
22 See infra Part Ill

21 See infra Part IV.
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II. The Explosive Growth of Spam
The use of Spain has been steadily increasing over the past
few years. The increase in just the past two years has been so
explosive that Spam is estimated to have accounted for 60% of all
email traffic in January 2004, or over 5 billion Spam emails on
average per day.24 The increase is staggering in comparison to 2001,
when Spam accounted for only 7% of all email traffic. 25 This
proliferation was aided by an increase in the number of companies
engaging in such advertising, the availability of easy-to-use tools to
send Spam, and a reduction of response rates from email users around
the world. 26 Furthermore, this growth was also fueled by marketers'
attraction to the Internet as a medium for reaching potential
customers. 7 According to recent studies, 8% of all web-advertising
dollars in 2000 was spent on email marketing. 28 By 2007,
expenditures are expected to reach $15.9 billion, reflecting a 21%
annual growth rate.9 This growth, however, comes at an increasing
price to United States corporations and consumers.
Part of the allure of Spam is the ability of marketers to shift
some
of
the costs ofAttacks,"
advertising
to consumers.
Some millions
marketers
resort to "Dictionary
a technique
that generates
of

24
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28 Id. at 15.
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email addresses by going through the entire alphabet in each letter
placeholder of an email address. 3 ' Ultimately, the vast majority of
these emails bounce back, generating a notification for each email
that must be processed.32 ISPs are then forced to expand their
networks and systems to accommodate the avalanche of this daily
Spam. 33 Companies are also forced to expand their networks to
process the Spam that does match an email address. 34 Additionally,
employees become less productive as they are forced to sort through
individual emails to eliminate Spam. 35 A recent study estimates that
Spam costs United States companies approximately $9 billion
annually, and United States and European ISPs an additional $500
million.36 Ultimately, these additional costs are likely to be passed on
to consumers in the form of higher prices for the products and
services that these companies provide.
If these costs were not enough to highlight the acuteness of
the problem, the intentionally unscrupulous use of Spam certainly
aggravates the situation. Of the total number of Spam emails
circulating, approximately 12% perpetrated some kind of fraud or
scam on their recipients, including pyramid schemes, stock and
investment scams, and solicitations for fake charitable causes.3 7 The
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") also indicated that a majority of
Spam contained deception in the text, the subject line, or the "from"
line. 38 For example, the FTC found that nearly half of the Spam that
it analyzed contained false information in the subject or "from"
line. 39 These messages claimed to be sent by someone having a

3' Bruce Johnson, Is There a ConstitutionalRight to Bombard the Public with
Penis EnlargementProposals?,21-SUM COMM. LAW. 3, 3 (2003).
32 Id.
33See generally ePrivacy Economics of Spam, supra note 7.

34 Cisneros, supra note 19, at 11, 19.
35Id.
36 Id.

37See the chart in Appendix 1 on p. 266 for a breakdown of Spam by
category. The information provided in Appendix 1 can be found at
http://www.brightmail.com/spamstats.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
38 David Bender, Recent Developments in Data ProtectionLaw, 764 PLI/PAT

9, 18 (2003).
39 Federal Trade Commission, False Claims in Spam, at 7 (Apr. 30, 2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/spam/030429spamreport.pdf.
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personal relationship with the recipient. 4° Such claims were
manifested by the use of a first name only in the "from" line,
suggesting that the sender was someone included in the recipient's
email address book.4 1 The FTC also noted that some Spam used
misleading subject lines, suggesting either a personal relationship
with the recipient or matters that bore no relationship to the content
of the message. 42 In addition, the FTC found that some marketers use
open relays to send Spam to disguise the origin of the messages.43
The FTC identified open relays in 59 countries, but 90% of these
relays were found in only 16 countries. a

As a result of these practices, over half of the states
promulgated laws to regulate, but not prohibit, Spam.45 These laws
typically: (1) prohibit the sending of unsolicited Spam that uses a
third party's Internet address or domain name without permission or
contains false or missing routing information; (2) require marketers
to include "ADV:" as the first four characters in the subject line of
the message; (3) require marketers to identify their email address; or
(4) require marketers to include instructions for, and to honor

40

Id. at 4.

41 Id.
42

Id. at 6.

See Federal Trade Commission, Law Enforcement Posse Tackles Internet
Scammers, Deceptive Spammers (May 15, 2003) (defining open relays as
unsecured servers that marketers use to mask the origin of their messages, and to
avoid
filtering
programs
used
by
ISPs),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/05/swnetforce.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).
43

44 Id. These countries are the United States, China, Korea, Japan, Italy,
Poland, Brazil, Germany, Taiwan, Mexico, Great Britain, France, Chile, Argentina,
India, Spain, and Canada.
45 See generally ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-41-201-205 (Michie 1987); CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 17529.2 (West 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2.5-101-105
(West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-451-453 (West 2003); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 931-939 (West 2004); IDAHO CODE § 48-603E (Michie 2003);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 714E.1 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6,107 (West
2002); MD. CODE. ANN., COMM. LAW, § 14-3002 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 325M (West 2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.020 (West 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-453 (2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 776 (West 2004); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1.5903 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-52-1-52-4 (West 2004); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-6 (Michie 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-603 (West
2003); VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-152.3:1 (Michie 2003); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN.
§§ 19.190.010-040 (West 2003).
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requests from, recipients to be excluded from future mailings.46 Some
states, such as California and Delaware, went further by barring
Spain completely, unless recipients expressly consented to receiving
it. 47 Virginia, through which half of the Internet traffic passes, went
even further by criminalizing the transmission of unsolicited bulk
email, the use or aiding in the use of a computer or network with
intent to falsify or forge email information, and the routing of
information in connection with the transmission of unsolicited bulk
email.48
ISPs have also reacted aggressively against Spam by suing
marketers sending it under a range of theories. 49 These actions have
included fraud and misrepresentation, trespass to chattel, trademark
infringement, and breach of contract.50 One of the early cases pursued
by an ISP was CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.5 In that
case, CompuServe claimed that Cyber Promotions trespassed on its
property by flooding its networks with Spam, whose origin was
intentionally masked to circumvent CompuServe's filtering
software. 52 The court found that Cyber Promotions' message caused
CompuServe real damage by draining its network resources, thereby
reducing the value of the company's computer equipment. 53 Thus, the
court granted CompuServe injunctive relief and enjoined Cyber
Promotions from sending Spam through CompuServe's networks.54
However, CompuServe was not the only ISP to pursue legal remedies
against marketers using Spam. In fact, America Online, Inc. ("AOL")
has been the most aggressive ISP, bringing more than 23 cases,

46 Ryman, supra note 18, at 15-17.
41 See generally CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17529.2 (West 2003); see also
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 931-939 (2003).
48

VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-152.3 (Michie 2003); see also Bender, supra note

37, at 25; Virginia Claims Toughest Anti-Spam Law in the Nation, 20 No. 7 COMP.

& INTERNET LAW 34, 35 (2003).
49 John B. Kennedy & Tracy Hatch, Recent Development in Consumer
Privacy: Focus on Spam and Identity Theft, 748 PLI/PAT 1219, 1230 (2003).
50 Id.
51

CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio

1997); see also Magee, supra note 8, at 348.
52 CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1019; see also Magee, supra note 8, at 348.
53 CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1022; see also Magee, supra note 8, at 34849.
54 CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1017; see also Magee, supra note 8, at 349.
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mostly successful, against marketers sending Spam through its
networks.55
ISPs also employed various filtering software to block Spam
before it would reach recipients or used Spam-reporting features that
allowed recipients to declare particular einails to be Spam. 56 But
these techniques encountered problems. Because filtering software
was designed to hone in on particular phrases or patterns, email
recipients had to constantly check to make sure that the filtering
software did not block legitimate emails. 57 ISPs also implemented
Spam-reporting features, which helped recipients block Spam from a
particular sender.58 Once a report had been made, the ISPs
individually decided whether or not to block all emails from the
sender to recipients on their respective networks. 59 However,
marketers complained that some recipients used this feature in place
of a request to unsubscribe from the senders' email list, thus making
a false report of Spam. As a result, marketers sending
advertisements with the consent of recipients could be summarily
blocked from an ISP's entire network. 6'
Some marketers tried unsuccessfully to challenge ISPs'
actions on constitutional grounds. One of the early challenges came
in Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., decided by a
federal court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 62 In America
Online, AOL blocked messages from Cyber Promotions after AOL's
users complained about receiving unsolicited advertisements from the
company. 3 Cyber Promotions sued AOL "seeking a ruling that it had
a First Amendment right to send its email advertisements through the

55 See

AOL Legal Department, AOL Junk Email Archive, available at
http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dljunk/aolarchive.html (last visited Mar. 6,
2004); see also Kennedy & Hatch, supra note 48, at 1230.
56 Johnson, supra note 31, at 4.
57 Id.
58 id.

59 Id.

6 Id.
61

See generally id.

62

Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa.

1995).
63

America Online, 948 F. Supp. at 437; see also Nicole A. Wong et al.,

Privacy & Marketing Issues, 755 PLIIPAT 11, 73 (July 2003).
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64 Ultimately, the court
Internet without AOL's interference. "'
dismissed Cyber Promotions' claim on the grounds that it had other
channels with which to distribute its advertisements, and that AOL
was a private enterprise and did not carry out any governmental65
functions subjecting it to the constraints of the First Amendment.
Similarly, other marketers unsuccessfully attempted to challenge
ISPs' actions to curb the marketers' access to their networks on the
grounds that such action restrained interstate commerce, and66thus,
contravened the dormant Commerce Clause in the Constitution.
On the federal level, the FTC brought its own enforcement
actions against marketers using Spam. 67 However, its enforcement
actions were limited to marketers who perpetrated fraud through
Spam.68 Since the middle of 2003, the FTC brought 53 enforcement
actions in cases that involved deceptive content in Spam, relying on
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTCA"), which
barred misrepresentation in marketing material. 69 More recently, the
FTC expanded the scope of its actions to combat not only deception
in the content of Spam, but also deception in the manner of
transmission of the message. v
Despite the growing chorus of governmental and private
actions against Spam, the use of Spam continued to grow at an
alarming rate. 71 Although some private actions stemmed the flow of
Spam from particular offenders, these actions were expensive and

65

America Online, 948 F. Supp. at 438.
Id. at 445.

66

Wong et al., supra note 63, at 73.

67

See generally id. at 20.

68

See generally Unsolicited Commercial Email: Testimony before the Senate

64

Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 108th Cong. 2-3 (2003) (statement of the

FTC), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/05/spamtestimony.pdf (last visited
Mar. 6, 2004) [hereinafter FTC Spain Statement].
69 Id. (noting the conclusion of its panel of experts that there is no quick or
simple solution to the problem of Spain. Instead, "solutions must be pursued from
many directions-technological, legal, and consumer action."); see also Federal
Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 5, 38 Stat. 717 (2003) (codified at

15 U.S.C.A. § 45).
70 FTC Spam Statement, supra note 68, at 2-3.
71

Id. (noting that Spam continues to grow at an exponential rate, putting email

at risk of loosing its utility as an effective method of communication and online
commerce).
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72
time consuming, and could only target one offender at a time.
Consequently, ISPs preferred to deal with Spam through filters and
other technological innovations, which, by themselves, created
unintended problems.73 In addition, the FTC's enforcement actions,
though successful in most cases, were limited in number and
restricted to addressing only fraudulent Spam.74 Similarly, state laws
did not seem to be effective in stemming the tide of Spam.75 Despite
state requirements that Spam include "opt-out" provisions,76 the FTC
found that 63% of the Spam it analyzed contained non-functional or
inoperative return addresses included in the Spam for just that
purpose.77 Furthermore, only 2% of the Spam analyzed by the FTC
contained "ADV:" in the subject line, as a majority of states
require. 78 Regardless of these requirements, states lacked the
necessary resources to provide adequate enforcement actions and to
identify Spam originators in a highly anonymous and decentralized
Internet. 79 In addition, the wide range and frequently dichotomous
array of state regulations presented a substantial hurdle for legitimate
marketers to adhere. There was a strong need for a national
framework that would unify the approach to Spam regulation and
provide a more effective solution to the problem.

III. Congress' First Attempt to Address Spam
Congress' response to the growing problem of Spam was to
propose a plethora of legislation that focused on various aspects of
72

Johnson, supra note 3 1, at 4.

73 Id. (noting that the number of addresses the software can block are limited,

and some recipients use the filtering software in place of the unsubscribe
mechanisms, thus making a false report of Spam to the ISP).
74 id.
Id. at 5.
76 Opt-out provisions require that a recipient of a Spam message affirmatively
requests the sender to exclude the recipient from the sender's email list for the
purposes of future mailings. For that purpose, senders of Spam are required to
include an appropriate means, such as an email address or a web site, for the
recipients to make such requests. See Johnson, supra note 3 1, at 5.
77 id.
78 id.
15

79 Id.

80 See Cisneros, supra note 19, at 12.
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the problem.8 ' In 2003 alone, nine proposals were presented in
Congress: (1) Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography
and Marketing Act ("CAN-SPAM Act"); 82 (2) Anti-Spam Act;8 3 (3)
Ban on Deceptive Unsolicited Bulk Electronic Mail Act; 84 (4)
Computer Owners' Bill of Rights; 85 (5) Criminal Spam Act;" (6)
Reduction in the Distribution of Spam Act; 87 (7) REDUCE Spam
Act; 88 (8) Stop Pornography and Abusive Marketing Act; 89 and (9)
Wireless Telephone Spam Protection Act. 90 Of this list, only the
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") was
enacted by Congress on December 8, 2003, 91 and signed into law by
President George W. Bush on December 16, 2003, effective as of
January 1, 2004.9 3 The following is a discussion of some pertinent
provisions of the Act.
A. Scope
At the outset, Congress declared that there was a substantial
government interest in the regulation of Spam. 94 However, Congress
expressly limited the scope of the Act to preventing fraudulent Spam
and ensuring that recipients have the right to be excluded from future

81

See

generally

Spam

Laws,

at

http://www.spamlaws.com/

federal/listl08.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Spam Laws].
82 S. 877, 108th Cong. (2003).
83

H.R. 2515, 108th Cong. (2003).

84
85

S. 1052, 108th Cong. (2003).
S. 563, 108th Cong. (2003).

86

S. 1293, 108th Cong. (2003).

87 H.R. 2214, 108th Cong. (2003).
'8

H.R. 1933, 108th Cong. (2003).

89 S.

1231, 108th Cong. (2003).

90 H.R.

122, 108th Cong. (2003).

9' See 149 Cong. Rec. H12854-08 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2003), available at 2003
WL 22889088.
92 See Fact Sheet, White House, Bush signs anti-Spam law (Dec. 16, 2003),
available at 2003 WL 22954891.
93 See Spam Laws, supra note 81.
94

CAN-SPAM Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1) (2003).
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Spam from the same source. 95 In other words, the Act was not
intended to regulate Spam as a whole. Instead, it focused only on the
small fraction of Spam messages that contained or perpetrated some
kind of fraud.
B. Prohibitions and Requirements
The Act prohibits the use of open relays to transmit Spam.96 It
also prohibits the initiation of Spam that contains materially false or
misleading header information. Under the Act, materially false or
misleading header information includes technically accurate header
information obtained by means of false or fraudulent pretenses or
misrepresentation. 98 The Act also prohibits the use of deceptive
subject lines and requires that the perpetrator has actual knowledge or
"knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances"99
that a reasonable recipient is likely to be misled by the subject line.
It also outlaws the use of automated means of identifying
email
1
addresses, such as "Dictionary Attacks," to transmit Spam. 00
Furthermore, the Act requires marketers to use a functioning
return address on their messages so that recipients can use it 01
to
request that they be excluded from future mailings from the sender.
In the alternative, the Act requires that some other mechanism be
included whereby the recipient can effectively opt out of future

9'15 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)-(3); see also S. REP. No. 108-102, at 1 (2003),
available at 2003 WL 21680759 (noting that the purpose of the Act is to "(i)
prohibit senders of electronic mail (e-mail) for primarily commercial advertisement
or promotional purposes from deceiving intended recipients or Internet service
providers as to the source or subject matter of their e-mail messages; (ii) require
such e-mail senders to give recipients an opportunity to decline to receive future
commercial e-mail from them and to honor such requests; (iii) require senders of
unsolicited commercial e-mail (UCE) to also include a valid physical address in the
e-mail message and a clear notice that the message is an advertisement or
solicitation; and (iv) prohibit businesses from knowingly promoting, or permitting
the promotion of, their trade or business through e-mail transmitted with false or
misleading sender or routing information.").
96 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1)(C).
97 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1)(A).
98 Id.

99 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(2).
00 15 U.S.C. § 7704(b)(1)-(3).
'0'15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(3)(A)-(B).
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mailings. 102 The Act further requires marketers to honor the
recipient's wish to be excluded from future mailings within ten
business days from the receipt of such a request. 1°3 It also requires
that Spam be clearly identified as advertisement or solicitation and
imposes additional
identifiers in the case of Spam containing sexually
10 4
explicit material.
C. Enforcement and Penalties
The Act makes a violation of its prohibitions and
requirements an unfair or deceptive act or practice also proscribed
under the FTCA. 105 This formulation allows the FTC to enforce the
prohibitions and requirements of the Act using the same enforcement
tools and actions it has been using to combat Spam. 106 Furthermore,
the Act authorizes other federal agencies to enforce its provisions
under pre-existing enforcement regimes when the senders of Spam
fall within the scope of that agency's oversight. 10 7 However, it is
unclear how a violation of the Act would be considered a violation
under some of the existing laws for the purposes of applying their
enforcement provisions. 108
The Act also authorizes states to pursue their own civil
actions against violators when the interest of a state resident is
threatened or adversely affected. 10 9 This authority is limited to
actions against using false or misleading header information, omitting
the proper warning in the header for Spam containing sexually
explicit material, or engaging in a pattern of failing to include means
for recipients to opt out of receiving future mailings or failing to
102 Id.
103 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(4)(A)(i)-(ii); see also 15 U.S.C. § 7704(c) (allowing
the FTC discretion to change the 10-day period if it deems necessary to fulfill the
objectives of the Act while not imposing undue burdens on senders of legitimate
commercial advertisements).
'04 15 U.S.C. § 7704(d) (requiring that the FTC, in consultation with the
Attorney General, develop a list of identifiers within 120 days of the Act's
enactment to be used by senders of Spam containing sexually explicit material to
identify it as such).
105 15 U.S.C. § 7706(a).
106

See generally 15 U.S.C. § 7706(a).

107 15 U.S.C. § 7706(b).
108

See generally 15 U.S.C. § 7706(b).

'09 15 U.S.C. § 7706(f)(1).
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honor such requests after a given time period.' 10 The Act also limits
the amount of damages that can be sought in such an action to the
greater of (a) actual loss suffered or (b) an amount, not exceeding $2
million, calculated by multiplying the number of violations by up to
$250.111 Furthermore, the Act allows an increase in the limit on
damages to $6 million if a court determines that the violation was
willful or if automated means, such as "Dictionary Attacks,"
were
112
used to generate email addresses to which Spam was sent.
In addition, the Act authorizes ISPs to bring civil actions
against violators that use false or misleading header information, use
automated means to generate email addresses to which Spam was
sent, send Spam containing sexually explicit material without the
proper warning, or engage in a pattern of violating the Act's
requirements.'13 In this type of action, the Act limits the amount of
damages that can be sought to the greater of (a) actual loss suffered
or (b) an amount, not exceeding $1 million, calculated by dividing
the number of violations by $100 in the case of false or misleading
header information, or $25 in all other cases. 114 The Act also allows a
court to increase the limit on damages to $3 million if the court
determines that the violation was willful or if automated means
were
15
used to generate email addresses to which Spam was sent.'
D. Do-Not-Email Registry
The Act requires the FTC to develop a plan and a timetable
for implementing a national Do-Not-Email Registry and to report this
plan and timetable to Congress no later than June 1, 2004.116 The Act
also authorizes the FTC to implement this plan no earlier than
September 16, 2004.117

110

Id.

.. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(f)(3)(A)-(B).
112 15 U.S.C. § 7706(f)(3)(C).
113

15 U.S.C. § 7706(g).

114

15

U.S.C. § 7706(g)(3)(A)-(B).

...
15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(3)(C).
116 15 U.S.C. § 7708(a).
"' 15 U.S.C. § 7708(b).

The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003

2004]

E. Effects on Other Laws
Congress stresses that the Act's provisions are not to be
construed to affect the enforcement of certain criminal statutes or the
FTC's authority to bring enforcement actions under the F17CA. 118 In
addition, nothing in the Act is to be construed as limiting or
prohibiting ISPs from instituting and enforcing limits on the
transmission, routing, relaying, handling, or storing of certain types
of email.' 19
Significantly, the Act supersedes any statute, regulation, or
rule of a state that expressly regulates the use of email to send
commercial messages.12 ° However, this provision does not apply to
any state statute or regulation that prohibits false statements or
deception in Spam.12 1 The Act will also not preempt state laws that
are not specific to email, such as laws relating to trespass, contract,
and tort22 law, or other laws that relate to acts of fraud or computer
1
crime.

IV. A Small Step in the Direction of Effective Spam
Regulation
The Act is certainly a step in the direction of addressing the
growing problem of Spam. The Act's co-authors, Senators Conrad
Burns and Ron Wyden, noted that it targets the most egregious
behavior by marketers using Spam and provides criminal sanctions to
combat them.12 3 Furthermore, it mandates truthfulness in header
information in Spam and the inclusion of pre-designated labels to
indicate the nature of its content.124 They stressed that these
requirements will assist ISPs in preventing these messages from
reaching their recipients through more effective use of software
filters upon request from recipients. 125 They also stressed that these
118

15 U.S.C. § 7707(a).

"9 15 U.S.C. § 7707(c).
120

15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1).

121

15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(2)(B).

122

15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(2)(A).

Sen. Conrad Bums & Sen. Ron Wyden, New Law Packs Potent Tools,
USA TODAY, Dec. 23, 2003, at 14, available at 2003 WL 5325709.
123

124

Id.

125

id.
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requirements will provide recipients effective means to opt out from
12 6
future mailings, thereby controlling access to their email accounts.
However, even Senators Bums and Wyden recognized that
the Act is not "a silver bullet that will completely rid the world of
Spam."'127 Critics of the Act charge that it fails to provide the most
fundamental element of any anti-Spam law: prohibiting the very use
of Spam.12 8 While the Act attempts to curb abusive practices, it
ignores the fact that 80% of Internet users found Spam to be "very
annoying" and 74% even favored making it illegal.' 9 In essence, the
Act legitimizes the Spam that does not use fraudulent header
information or promote fraud in its content. The Act's supporters
point out that the absence of fraudulent header information will make
30
filtering programs more effective in blocking unwanted Spam.
However, this objective ignores the fact that making the ISPs' task of
filtering Spam easier will not eliminate the added costs to ISPs of
processing the messages or ensuring that marketers will not find other
ways to circumvent the software's function. Furthermore, this claim
also ignores the inconvenience to recipients, who waste time in
making sure that the filters do not block legitimate messages.'31
Moreover, some commentators noted that marketers can use
the Act as a defense from prosecution if they implemented reasonable
practices to prevent violations of the Act, and yet, violations still
occur despite their good faith efforts to comply with those
practices. 13 Moreover, aside from the right of ISPs to pursue Spam
users for specific violations, the Act does not evince a private right of

126

Id.

127

Id.

128

Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email (CAUCE), CAUCE

2003),
available at
16,
(Dec.
CAN-SPAM Act
Statement on
http://www.cauce.org/news/index.shtnil (last visited Feb. 13, 2004) [hereinafter
CAUCE Statement]. CAUCE is an Internet-based advocacy group that works to
promote awareness of the problem of Spam and lobbies legislators to pass laws to
curb the abuses of Spam. CAUCE is not "an industry lobbying group" in that it
does not accept donations or charge for its membership. The organization is web-

based

and

relies

on

volunteers

to

do

all

its

work.

See

http://www.cuace.org/about/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
129 Dawn Estes & Bhaveeni Parmar, Spam, Spam and More Spam, 5 No. 7 ECOM. L. REP. 5, 5 (2003).
130 Bums & Wyden, supra note 123.
131

Cisneros, supra note 19, at 11.

132

Bender, supra note 38, at 27.
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civil action to consumers
33 to protect themselves against repeated
infractions by marketers.'
In addition, the Act's preemption of state anti-Spam laws
34
significantly retards progress towards a resolution of the problem.
One can speculate that such preemption was an attempt by Congress
to make laws regulating Spam more uniform to relieve the burden of
compliance from legitimate marketers.' 35 However, since laws in
some states were stronger in that they require affirmative consent by
recipients prior to receiving Spam, the Act's preemption of these
laws and replacement of their provisions with more narrowly
defined
36
requirements serves to only weaken consumer rights. 1
Last, the Act's mere authorization, and not requirement, of the
FTC to institute a Do-Not-Email Registry brings back memories of
the plodding pace with which the Do-Not-Call Registry, originally
authorized in the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
("TCPA"),137 was developed. The TCPA authorized the Federal
38
Communications Commission to develop such a registry.'
Ultimately, the establishment of the Do-Not-Call Registry took 12
years and another law requiring its formation by a completely
different government agency.
Thus, based on this experience, an
enabling law alone is not likely to ensure that a Do-Not-Email
Registry would be established with the urgent pace that the problem
of Spam demands.
133CAUCE Statement, supra note 128 (noting that "[a]t the FTC's Spam
forum in May 2003, FTC officials and a representative of the National Association
of Attorney's General stated clearly that neither the FTC nor state law enforcement
agencies have the time, money, or resources, needed to engage in enough antiSpam prosecutions to make a dent in the problem. Similarly, attorneys representing
ISPs noted that they cannot afford to bring cases without the risk of spending more
money than they'd ever recover from spammers.").
134Id.
135 Congress Preempts States, Particularly Cal., on Privacy and
Spam,
WARREN'S WASH. INTERNET DAILY,

Nov. 28, 2003, Vol. 4, Issue 229, available at

2003 WL 16118721.
136 See id.; see also supra Part II.

137Telephone Fraud Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227
(2002).
138See generally Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)of 1991, 68 Fed. Reg. 16250 (April 3,2003) (to
be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64).
139Ian Heath Gershengorn, Telemarketing Restrictions and the First
Amendment, 20-SUM COMM. LAW. 3, 4 (2002).
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The initial impact of the legislation is not encouraging.
Brightmail, a company specializing in filtering Spam, reported that
the level of Spam in email traffic actually increased to 60% of total
email traffic in January 2004 from 58% in December 2003.140 Even
worse, AOL reported a 10% increase in the Spam received from
overseas in the same period, perhaps a bid by marketers to evade the
provisions of the Act. 41 Marketers were openly relieved at the Act's
preemption of what most of them perceived as draconian state laws,
such as the California law requiring affirmative consent by recipients
prior to sending any Spam. r42 Moreover, marketers admitted that,
while they were planning to curtail their use of Spam to comply with
the various4 3state laws, they no longer felt that such moves were
necessary. 1
The long-term impact of the Act is also unclear. Some of the
Act's benefits are derived from the ISPs' ability to develop and
maintain filtering software that can detect and block Spam from
reaching its recipients. Such software is necessarily dependent on the
skill and resources of ISPs to continuously update it in an effort to
counteract the virtually certain efforts by marketers to bypass this
software. The Act also depends on the effective enforcement of its
provisions in the faceless labyrinth of the Internet, a task that
agencies like the FTC admit to be daunting. 144 In addition,
eviscerating the states' ability to identify and address problems with
Spam within their borders is unlikely to make state agencies
enthusiastic participants in a federal cause that expressly disavows
their views.
Perhaps the clearest impact of the Act is that it will not stop

Brightmail Spam Statistics, supra note 24.
141 Anick Jesdanum, New Tools Failingto Keep Spam in Control, PASADENA
STAR NEWS, Jan. 11, 2004, available at http://www.pasadenastartnews.com/stories
(last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
142 See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17529.2 (West 2003); see also
140

Jesdanum, supra note 129.
143 Jesdanum, supra note 141.
144 Kris Oser, One Step Closer, DIRECT, Nov. 1, 2003, at 1 (noting FTC's

concern about enforceability of the Act because of the anonymous nature of Spam),
available at 2003 WL 8203894.
145 See generally supra Part IlI.E.
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Spam. 14 6 As some critics of the Act contend, the Act practically
legalizes the use of non-deceptive Spam.1 47 Although reduction or
elimination of deceptive Spam is certainly a worthwhile objective,
this feat, by itself, represents only an element and not the core of the
problem. Ultimately, Spam pits the privacy interests of consumers
against the commercial interests of marketers. When such interests
collide, the interest of consumers must outweigh the interests of
marketers; a position that is squarely consistent with Congress'
expressed view
when it promulgated the Do-Not-Call
Implementation Act of 2003 to regulate
telephone access to
48
consumers in the telemarketing industry.'

VI. Conclusion
The CAN-SPAM Act is Congress' first attempt to address the
problem of Spam on a national level. The Act was designed to stop
Spam that perpetrates fraud and uses fraudulent means in its
dissemination.' 49 Although the Act is certainly a step in the direction
of controlling the problem of Spam, it weakens other legal tools that
were promulgated for that very purpose. In particular, preempting
state laws and replacing them with a mere prohibition on fraud gives
marketers a virtual green light to send Spam to anyone they choose.
Furthermore, Congress' failure to require the creation of a Do-NotEmail list in the Act ignores its own experience with the glacial pace
by which the Do-Not-Call Registry was created for the telemarketing
industry. Ultimately, the Act is unlikely to stem the growing tide of
Spam and may actually help increase its rate of growth as marketers
develop methods of circumventing filtering software. If Congress
intended to give regulators a fly swatter, they ended up giving them
one with holes so large that the commercial robotic pests of Phillip K.
Dick's world could fly through them with relative ease.

'46
147

CAUCE Statement, supra note 123.
See supra Part III.A, Part IV.

148 See generally Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 10810, 117 Stat. 557 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108).
149 See generally Part III.A.
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Appendix I

Spam Categories

Fraud, 4%
Internet, 5%--

Political, 2%

Leisure, 6%
Health, 7%
\ Products, 22%
Scams, 8%

,,

Financial, 20%
Adult, 17%T

Source: Brightmail, Spam Statistics, available at
spamstats.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2004).

http://brightmail.com/

